Although neuroethics is not going to bridge the is-ought divide, it may establish certain facts that require us to rethink the way we achieve our ethical aspirations.Ĭontemporary societies are rife with moral disagreement, resulting in recalcitrant disputes on matters of public policy. The neuroscience of morality, however, is providing relevant evidence that any empirically-informed ethical theory needs to critically consider. Whereas the neuroscientific picture of human morality is undoubtedly valuable if we avoid neuroessentialistic portraits, the empirical disruption of normative ethics seems less plausible. In this article, the author shows that they can be understood together, although with different caveats, under the label of ‘neurofoundationalism’. Both claims have some truth but are also overstated. Secondly, some neuroscientific findings are radically challenging traditional views on normative ethics. First, it is transforming the view of human morality through the discovery of the neurobiological underpinnings that influence moral behavior. The neuroscience of ethics is allegedly having a double impact. I conclude that militaries should therefore begin to employ MANE for unjust POWs.
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Sixth, basic principles of proper medical care support the use of MANE on unjust POWs as pro tanto morally obligatory. Because MANE is likely to help unjust POWs irrespective of their consent or lack thereof, its use is permissible. Fifth, medical experimentation likely to help nonconsenting persons is sometimes permissible. Thus, 3 and 4 are false when applied to unjust POWs. Fourth, we should accept a broader construal of “benefit” that includes moral benefits. Third, just as incarceration is often permissible despite benefitting society but not the incarcerated, the same holds for unjust POWs. Second, the relevant infections and illnesses caused by MANE are less bad than death, so MANE leaves unjust POWs better off than the alternative. First, the permissibility of killing unjust combatants entails that, in cases where MANE is equally or more likely as termination to reduce moral recidivism in unjust combatants, then MANE is morally justified. Herein, I defend MANE’s use for prisoners of war (POWs) fighting unjustly. However, critics of MB raise four central objections to MANEs use: (1) It destroys moral freedom (2) it kills one moral agent and replaces them with another, better agent (3) it carries significant risk of infection and illness (4) it benefits society but not the enhanced person and (5) it’s wrong to experiment on nonconsenting persons. Moral agential neuroenhancement (MANE) can transform us into better people. Systematically assessing MBE interventions across the presented categories should provide valuable conclusions about its theoretical soundness and feasibility, its compatibility with fundamental moral norms, and its compatibility with or facilitation of socio-political goals of equality and justice. More precisely, I propose three important theoretical and normative standards that MBE should satisfy if we wish to mitigate the concerns about its utter impermissibility. I identify a list of factors that may be of crucial importance for illuminating the matters of moral permissibility in the MBE debate and which could help us move beyond the current lack of consensus. This article reviews the discussion on MBE, showing that a lack of consensus about enhancements’ desirable features and the constant development of the debate calls for a more rigorous ethical analysis. The ongoing debate about moral bioenhancement (MBE) has been exceptionally stimulating, but it is defined by extreme polarization and lack of consensus about any relevant aspect of MBE.